Intro

The issue is simple: can God judge fairly, and does He? It might sound trivial to ask this, but eventually one runs into one of the questions here.

For example, if we are saved by no other name under heaven than Jesus' (Acts 4:12), what about Pacific Islanders in 50 AD? Are they automatically damned because of what amounts to basically a technicality? Why was the tree of knowledge placed in the Garden of Eden if God didn't want Adam and Eve eating from it? Why does a condemned man get an indefinite punishment (Hell) for finite, usually forgettable sins?

If these questions keep you up at night, you're at the right place!

I. Nature of Fairness

This section is more of a background and does not start addressing the main issue(s). It may seem unnecessary, but it can be distracting to not have some solid idea of what constitutes "fair" vs "unfair", at least in a broad but defined sense.

What is sin?

If sin is an object (predicate) what are its properties, and if it's a concept, what does it entail and is it consistent?

But, simply, sin is a concept both in its technical nature (God ordains it) and how it's committed by individuals (Rom. 14:5, 23). It's the rejection of God's will and power. The question of how this is possible with an omnipotent being is addressed elsewhere. Like crime in law, this article is concerned only with its effects. Questions like "why X is a sin or not" simply become the Euthyphro Dilemma.

Saved from what?

Christopher Hitchens asks this question, and it may seem obvious, but the point is very good and leads to the main ideas in this whole article. What exactly is God saving us from? If we say, "damnation", the follow up question is immediately, "Isn't He the one who damns?" But this misunderstands the fact that our choices are no one else's fault, and that normally they would be punishable.

Nature of Man

In many places the Bible describes how man's nature is fundamentally corrupt and deviant. This is in contrast to some of the Greek philosophies such as the Stoics who considered man to be ultimately good, but contaminated by various experiences and shortcomings in life. For example, Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations VII.5 writes, "Dig deep within. Within is the fountain of good. And it will ever bubble up, if you will ever dig." (Classics Club).

Paul says something similar in Romans 7:22-23, but obviously there speaks of believers like him. Essentially most of Romans 7 deals with the relationship between will, temptation, sin, and God. A person is born and like the Parable of the Mustard Seed goes one way or another for whatever reason. With respect to original sin, Hauer and Young suggest that perhaps St. Augustine misinterpreted Romans 5:18,

it was the interpretation of this passage...that led to the Christian doctrine of "original sin," the view that all humans after Adam and Eve inherit their sin. Scholars dispute whether that is possible, not to mention necessary, interpretation of the Greek of these verses. In the view of many, it is more likely that Paul was stipulating that all humans are prone to sin, not that Adam's sin is passed through inheritance, like a genetic flaw. [Introduction to the Bible: A Journey into Three Worlds (7th ed.), p.322]

Romans 7:25 seem to say so as well. In Rom. 5:9,17-19 the antithesis between Adam's sin and Jesus' salvation also seems to suggest this: or is righteousness also hereditary? That Paul neither outright states it nor defends it against outcries of injustice is also perhaps an indication that he merely meant that sin and temptation entered the world in a place (Eden) where like the home of the angels, it previously didn't exist. Adam and Eve sinned at a command (Rom. 7:14), not a naturally arising inclination (James 1:14-15). However, being born guilty is not unjustified for the same reason that anyone, aside from Christ, was born as a human and not an angel and all are sinners. A common justification used sometimes is how Hebrews 7:9-10 says in a sense Levi tithed Melchizedek because Abraham did so and Levi came from him. But I think this is a metaphor, not a direct chain of cause and effect.

God does not tempt, but tests

Intent explains the difference between God testing someone versus the Devil tempting them. In Job it's almost as if the two of them are in collusion over the poor man. The difference is the Devil just delights in evil (Rom. 1:32), while God tries to expose and correct. But correct what? If a man is elect, then he'll be saved, so why reprove him? If not, then what could change his mind (Luke 16:31)? But just as Paul says in Romans 9:18-23, God reserves the right to instruct because of sins, so it's mercy that one is being reproved so little for sins as a righteous person (Heb. 12:7-11), even if it's true that some of the elect angels would have sinned if they were tempted like us (curious if any would or not), yet God never will let them experience pain or discomfort. Like a symbol. This is why man shouldn't test God in matters of morality (Matt. 4:7, citing Deut. 6:16; 1 Cor. 10:9-10), but personal knowledge (Judges 6:39). Even a genuine inquiry like Job's could be reproved, while commands from God to even kill one's own son should be followed without considering it wrong (Gen. 22:2).

Euthyphro Dilemma: What is fairness?

The simple definition of culpability (or lack thereof) would be similar to most things we're familiar with in law: unobstructed intent. This would mean that rather than circumstances, it is the person's intent that gets them accused or absolved. Nothing external (other objects) or internal (temptations beyond one's ability, mental problems, etc) should be factored in if they obscure the original intent of the individual.

Since unlike human courts, God has all the evidence and is not, according to most theology at least, malicious, we don't need to worry about whether the angels got back to Heaven with all the evidence on time or not!

Fairness and its application to God's judgment

Many of God's commands - don't steal, don't murder - are self-evident in preserving not just justice, but human rights. Some, however, are more symbolic such as the food laws or the Sabbath. Others are entirely constructed by God such as the prohibition against blasphemy, idolatry, fornication.

Arguably this last category has to do with God's respect. But when one considers the punishment, the question of fairness comes up. But to understand why these injunctions exist is related to why the symbolic commands such as to not make clothes from mixed materials (Lev. 19:19) did. For those, God wanted his nation to stand out physically as well as spiritually from the surrounding unbelievers. Circumcision is the most well-known of these, because it's the most obvious and reminded the individual daily who he was or at least was supposed to be.

When Paul says that the true circumcision is in the heart, he wasn't saying anything new. Simply after the Messiah's arrival, the spiritual commands are left, which just like their physical counterpart were meant to reflect self-control. Sin he measures by self-serving actions (Rom. 2:8). And God is not a hypocrite. Otherwise Jesus wouldn't have been sent - something that God certainly didn't owe us.

But self-control against what? To what evil does cursing out with God's name lead, when no one could apparently even know it (Rev. 19:12)? Thus it's the intent of an individual, who, if he were to know the name, would profane it. And this test of self-control applies to what this individual would do if he were given more power and freedom: to what end would his disrespect continue? These tests might seem peripheral to this question, but ultimately just as we have two arms instead of three, God made them in a way with respect to us that He knows would test us accurately. It's exactly because of this that Jesus says, "he who can be trusted with little, can be trusted with much" (Luke 16:10) - if you can be trusted with such little leeway to correct behavior (temptations, restrictions), then you definitely won't have a problem when it's easier (e.g. the elect angels who were never tempted). This is why the tree of knowledge was placed in Eden while telling Adam and Eve not to eat from it, without it being entrapment - in the face of this they didn't listen. As Paul tells us, the Law is a mirror for us to see our unrighteousness (Rom. 7:13a).

Can we question God's judgments?

When Job tried it, God reminded him who the creator of the world was (Job 38; 41). What might at first seem like an authoritarian "might makes right" counter-argument is actually a subtle hint that God's knowledge, demonstrated by his power, far exceeds Job's and Job could not possibly understand God's reasons any more than a child can understand quantum physics (Job 38:2-3). After all, how can Job know his own self and what choices he would make better than God to demand what he considered justice? Didn't Jonah think it was fair for the Ninevites to be wiped out rather than forgiven?

Abraham also tried a more conciliatory approach, pleading for the fate of Sodom where his relative Lot was (Gen. 18:23-33). Of course, God conceded that if there were even 5 righteous men, he wouldn't destroy the city. Of course, many prophets frequently changed God's attitude: David with the plague for example (2 Sam. 24). These changes He was clearly planning from the beginning because He shortened the days of plague without anyone's request, whereas in Abraham's case He was unwilling to forego punishment for less than 5 righteous men, even though the decrease from 5 to 1 is not much compared to reducing 50 to 5.

But the main question remains: can we legitimately ask if God is justified in his action in some/any situation? After all, can we ask if gravity or electricity are "justified" in doing what they do? They might do something unfair, or dare I say, shocking, but it happens both to gullible and down to Earth people. I'm not saying that God can't be unfriendly - this is perfectly valid. What I want to ask is can I object to perceived injustice? Paul posits the same question by saying, can a pot ask the potter, "Why did you make me like this?" (Rom. 9:18-23). Maybe to me it seems unfair, but can I really know true justice, and can I really object to anything even if I could? If God commands it, it can't be wrong - Abraham was told to sacrifice Isaac and had to do it.

But the Bible has many places where justice is presumed to be quite understandable by humans and completely relatable (Luke 18:1-8; Matt. 18:21-35). In fact, it's a little hard to understand how repentance could be distinguishable from evil (Matt. 5:14-16), if there wasn't some sort of inalienable logic that humans, and probably most animals (Num. 22:30), could inherently grasp. The fact that Genesis 1:26 states man was made in God's image should extend to understanding basic concepts like this in my opinion. As far as Paul's statement, it had everything to do with the inclusion of Gentiles in salvation (vv.24-26) versus only Jews due to Abraham's promise (Gen. 12, 15), not that God's decisions are by definition sacrosanct. The authoritative aspect is similar to God's answer in Job: a person cannot know why he was tested resulting in his sin, whereas another isn't tempted at all, because no one is allowed to be tempted beyond what they can endure (1 Cor. 10:13).

Paul's argument for God's indiscriminate mercy is one of Earthly situations, not spiritual destinations (Jonah 1:14 - "you, Lord, have done as you pleased" with the storm). This is supported because the part from Exodus Paul cites itself says Pharaoh hardened his heart by his own choices, but the situation was clearly brought about by God (Exodus 9:34). The same idea occurs elsewhere (Jonah 1:7-15). When Abimelech took Sarah as a wife, not knowing she was Abraham's. God reveals the truth and Abimelech defends himself, saying:

Did he not say to me, She is my sister, and didn t she also say, He is my brother ? I have done this with a clear conscience and clean hands. Then God said to him in the dream, Yes, I know you did this with a clear conscience, and so I have kept you from sinning against me. That is why I did not let you touch her. Now return the man s wife, for he is a prophet, and he will pray for you and you will live. But if you do not return her, you may be sure that you and all who belong to you will die. (Gen. 20:5-7)

God doesn't just arbitrarily make some sin or not and then condemn them. The Pharaoh was raised up for the Exodus (v.17). It was through Jacob that Israel came, not Esau (v.13), who would later prove his unworthiness by selling out his birthright for a meal (Heb. 12:16-17). From the Mari Tablets we know a word was a legally binding contract at the time - just like Isaac couldn't take back his blessing on Jacob, despite the deception - and Esau would've known this, so he had no excuse. Paul himself says it was God's grace that he was saved (1 Cor. 15:10), but that he received mercy because his obstacle was only the technicality of knowledge (1 Tim. 1:13). His attribution to God is the physical salvation and forgiveness, not his own repentance.

Perhaps Paul is talking about the temptations God causes people to be put under. So he raised people like the Pharaoh to sin in order that His glory might be revealed. Then the question, "why are we condemned? who can resist God?" makes more sense. Paul's answer echoes Job 38 where God's knowledge and power are supreme over man's. But there's a logical jump to mean this makes His decisions of who He tempts arbitrary. Knowing that He's not tempting beyond what they are able to bear (1 Cor. 10:13), He puts them in an irresistible position not from Himself, but from their own choices.

The spiritual quality of people is known beforehand by God (v.11), and therefore it's not works that impress: can you feed a hungry man if you have no money? None of the Pharaohs before Moses had to deal with God and the Exodus - is it fair on the one who did? That's Paul's argument - you can't tell God that it is or isn't as if you know better. Like in John 9:1-3, God's power and glory displayed in verses 22-23 are physical because in verse 22 these are already "objects of wrath" - i.e. people who did not repent. So is God making them unrepent twice if He's damning them and they aren't themselves? Or is He meting out physical punishment to show His mercy on Earth to the righteous (Prov. 15:6)? So the question in verse 19 misunderstands this very idea, that God knows who we are better than our own actions in this world/reality.

How does God measure Punishment?

What temperature do Hell's fires need to be to evenly punish a thief? A murderer? This question is complicated by the fact that frequently the abuser only has a general idea about the harm he does, and sometimes only knows that he's just doing something incorrect.

Since we can't assume that every unrepentant person would, under some circumstances, become a Hitler - that is, there are varying degrees of real choice, we can't say that it's irrelevant as all would be ultimately given enough opportunity "infinitely" evil.

But although this is a very valid question, it's easy to forget that for every ounce of knowledge given a certain action, if this knowledge can be gauged, however vaguely, it still must, by definition be describable, or else there can be no intent. For example, if I steal a bike, I must know it's doing some degree of discomfort. This vagueness may be unquantifiable by me, but that doesn't mean it's unquantifiable at all. Furthermore, just as a drunk driver never intends to crash but is still culpable for whatever accident he causes, so also it may as well be irrelevant what exactly I know about the pain that my wrongful actions create - and that I can be judged by this pain, rather than my knowledge. Because culpability is gauged entirely by intent, which needs knowledge. But the question here has nothing to do with that - the culpability is presumed - but with the extent of the necessary punishment.

Therefore, just as pain can be measured by neuron activity, so also can the flames be accurately adjusted.

Problem of Evil

I don't discuss the Problem of Evil here, but it's obviously related. As was mentioned, some people draw the short straw, some don't, and God orchestrates it all. It doesn't make one or the other worse sinners (Luke 13:2). But if our true crimes are hidden by circumstances (e.g. would I be a tyrant if I were king, and how bad a tyrant?), then it's the moments of peace that we get which are technically "unfair" but given by God's mercy (Matt. 5:45; Acts 14:17).

II. Problems of Fairness

1. Is Hell fair with no Warning

But is it fair that, say an ancient Egyptian murderer, neither knew Hell existed nor that it was his punishment - and had no idea God watched his every move and what he was doing was a class-A sin? What if he was extremely jealous, like Cain? What if he had a moment of rage? It doesn't have to be a cold-blooded murderer. The problem with the defense of "I didn't know," is that it ultimately comes in cases like these from, "I don't care." A drunk driver who causes an accident doesn't intend it, but he knowingly took the risk by drinking and driving. He pays the penalty as if he intentionally caused the accident. It doesn't matter whether he knew the penalty, or exactly how serious it was - he knew he wasn't supposed to drink and drive. And in the case of sins, this lack of knowledge is a trivial technicality because God knows what this person would do in any given circumstance. God has merely chosen one scenario in which to expose it (Rom. 7:22-23). It's a little like how Alexander rejected the idea of a night attack at Gaugamela saying, "I didn't come so darkness would steal my glory" - he wanted to beat the Persians at their best. And this is why sins in one's thoughts are as real as if they were performed: genuine desire is usually stopped only by lack of physical opportunity. This is not "thought control" any more than a therapist is one.

2. Those who never heard the gospel, children, the mentally challenged

An 8th century bishop, Vergilius of Salzburg, was nearly excommunicated for holding the belief that antipodes, people on the other side of the world whose feet faced theirs, existed. The reason was exactly because of this objection (and apparently a misunderstanding of Romans 2:10-12 or Acts 17).

The fate of men who never technically heard of Jesus cannot be assumed to automatically equate with damnation. As we see with Abimelech in Genesis 20, God is no legalist. That many righteous who never heard of Jesus could've been saved is fully proven by how Paul himself was converted. He was simply zealous without the proper knowledge, but otherwise on the right path (1 Tim. 1:13). A story, possibly legendary and modeled on Acts 17, has a pre-Columbian Texcoco king, Nezahualcoyotl, build a personal altar devoid of images and sacrifices, dedicated to the "unknown God". Even if apocryphal, this shows that the idea of a righteous pagan was never unthinkable.

Overall, the conscience is the guide by which a man is judged (Rom. 2:10-16; possibly also Rom. 10:18). This isn't a static block of stone like the Ten Commandments, but the personal beliefs of what a man thinks is right or wrong down to the most detailed point of decency. While one man's conscience differs from another's (Rom. 14:5), this is not relative morality any more than different languages' word for "rose" makes the plant non-absolute. Or if one objects that it's still the same "static" thing, then the fact that some countries like Japan and Britain drive on the left side doesn't make their traffic laws any less valid, because there are inevitable points of agreement (e.g. traffic lights), so the differences in men's consciences are in the details (what is respect), not the basics (that respect is good), because it's logical (the Golden Rule). So this is why Paul says he wouldn't have known covetousness was a sin apart from the Law (Rom. 7:7-12), but now this culture produced in him a mentality where he might disobey against his conscience (Rom. 7:14ff.).

This might seem to make animals, at least mammals and birds, accountable for their actions, because they can also feel guilt and know between what their owner for example doesn't want them to do. But because they don't have free will in the same way as us, they are excused. Perhaps their knowledge is insufficient, or maybe they have more limited abilities, not a true free will but like robots. Or maybe they are just influenced beyond what they can be accountable for. But even the dangerous animals are brought back on the New Earth (Isaiah 11:6-8), showing God's mercy.

In the case of children, these are obviously in this case too young to understand many things and obviously God forgives them, knowing they'd probably grow up to be righteous (Matt. 18:3-6). The same would be true of anyone with mental challenges, depending on the degree. The body is a vessel; a phone with a poor connection doesn't mean the caller is unclear, and God can know the intent of everyone.

3. Hell for (Finite) Sins?

If we think about all the possibilities a person could be put in, we will quickly understand that the lives we lead are by no means the epitome of either our good or evil. What I mean by this is that if you or I were a king, we would be either much better or worse people (in terms of works), depending what choices we make, but the important difference here being that we have more opportunity to do good or evil. Given this analogy, imagine that each of us had unlimited power - what would we do? The man who only stole gum on occasion may not necessarily be as innocent as he seems, fundamentally speaking. What if it were easier to steal more valuable things? Or worse crimes? God only would know these questions, but we can be sure that He wouldn't condemn someone based solely on the crimes of a 9 year old. And if a man steals enough gum, over an infinite amount of time, it adds up to him inflicting an infinite amount of pain; as comical as it may seem, it's mathematically true.

It can legitimately be argued that the owner might not care that someone only stole gum from him once in a while - perhaps like the priest with Jean Valjean in Les Miserables. But we can't assume that this person would only ever steal gum (from owners who didn't care): God would know if this is the case and not put him in a situation where he perishes over a technicality.

Here I deal with a specific, but integral core of thoughts, centered around a simple but important premise: that this life does not uncover the complete extent of our culpability, and that God's punishment is based on a judgment of our true nature and not the mere outward reflection of this world.

Same Hell for a murderer and a liar?

Is it fair for a compulsive thief who stole little things like gum to go to the same Hell as Hitler? Obviously there are different levels of the severity of crimes. All sins lead to death, but with respect to humans, the Bible considers some to obviously be worse than others (2 Kings 24:3-4; 1 Cor. 5:1).

But do we know that the gum thief would never go further and steal, say, cars? Perhaps he might have to assault a few security guards. Maybe more than assault. In Shakespeare's Hamlet, Ophelia says, "We know what we are, but not what we may be." This is essentially Plato's Cave with respect to sin and choice here. If God knows all, then He certainly wouldn't let a mere "gum thief" go to Hell over that. He would've done something to allow Him to repent if the thief would have. If God is fair, the opposite must be the case (Luke 16:31), and this person would've done worse things if given more opportunity to do so.

Lincoln said, "Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man s character, give him power." God would know whether anyone would abuse their power. A physical circumstance where one only expresses this abuse as minor theft is merely legalism: results over (masked) intent. It presumes that the universe and outcomes within it are the ultimate judge. Physical outcomes here only serve to reflect a person's repentance or lack thereof, like a mirror (1 Cor. 13:9-12).

And if we don't assume something like Dante's levels of Hell, it is not the case that the liar is punished extra and goes to the same Hell as the murderer, but the murderer is mercifully taken to the "lower" Hell of the liar. This is the converse of the Parable of the Workers (Matt. 20:1-16, especially vv.13-15), where one who did more works than another, both go to the same Heaven; God being merciful to the second, as opposed to ungrateful to the first (also cf. the angels' complaint, personified by the older son in The Prodigal Son - Luke 15:28-32).

This is contrary to the human reaction. Papias c.120 AD tells us of three levels of Heaven (perhaps misunderstanding 2 Cor. 12:2): those with few works get the city (New Jerusalem), those with an average amount (according to their ability) get Paradise, or New Earth, and those with many go to Heaven. Certainly freedom exists for how many good or bad things a man can do. But ultimately, if God is forgiving sins that would cast one away from His presence entirely, obviously he can forgive the absence of extra works that would keep someone on a lower cloud in Heaven.

Infinite sins for both believers and the damned

So let's explore the idea that other circumstances would result in men being either saints or tyrants. What if an unrepentant person would have repented if he lived another 5 years? 10? Of course, if we say, "Well, if he lived for an infinite amount, he'd have an infinite number of sins," then:

1. How can God know what's at the end of infinity?

2. Wouldn't the saved also have an infinite number of sins (no one is perfect)?

(1) Spacetime isn't needed to know someone's intentions: all one needs is knowledge of his timeless free-willed intentions. Then one can know his intentions for any amount of time. It's like knowing that x-x equals 0 for any number x. And this doesn't equate a person to a deterministic formula, because he has made these choices already, they simply haven't been expressed in physical reality yet. This is why Satan (and the other fallen angels) were kicked out instantaneously from Heaven (Luke 10:18): God doesn't need to see him sin to know it, and to know he would never stop. We cannot invoke higher cardinality time, because what if they would've repented on this "longer infinity" of time? But God knows counterfactuals and knows who would choose sin forever without needing to know the end of any infinite amount of time.

(2) This is a simple question of convergence, and possibly why MT 5:48 doesn't contradict FvW, though that could be an expression.

Penitent vs Unrepentant if both Inf Sins

The penitent and unregenerate are willing to sin an infinite amount of times or in magnitude. These sins would be of their own volition if their wills existed in a "vacuum". As it is, on Earth, there are both good influences and temptations. Because of the differences of intent, on an infinite timeline the believer would stop his sins forever just like the elect angels, whereas the unrepentant wouldn't - like Satan and the demons. What if some of the damned would've never sinned in Heaven with no temptation? But that just means the test is perfectly fair and balanced: the righteous can be trusted under pressure, the unrighteous can't be trusted without supervision.

This also solves an occasionally encountered conundrum of "what if I sin after I go to Heaven?" Paul hints at something similar in Acts 24:16, which one might object to on the realistic logic of Ecclesiastes 7:20, but the Acts passage hints at more than a "on average" situation for Paul abstaining from sin. Certainly it's possible to have a sinless day or week/month. Anyway, man has no excuse for his sins and could abstain from them, but reality is different (Rom. 3:23; Luke 17:1). Conversely, the damned would've never stopped, hence why no salvation for demons (Hebrews 2:14-16, 2 Peter 2:4, Matt. 25:41), and why the elect angels will never sin (not because of no free will). Alternatively, perhaps if some or all of the elect had been made like the elect angels from the beginning, they would've sinned but been contrite - unlike the demons currently. Either way, the solution works, because God isn't a legalist. It is a good question whether the elect angels would have ever (non-infinitely in magnitude) sinned.

The unregenerate may or may not stop sinning at some point, if some of their sins are infinite in magnitude, but the penitent certainly would have to. This isn't legalism: if someone continues to mess up once in a while and technically live in sin during those mess ups, why would God forgive them and how are they in any real sense repentant?

Otherwise, why not simply erase (or save!) the damned, after a finite punishment? After all, God's erasing the sins of the penitent. The reasoning above that the damned cannot be finitely punished perhaps also shows the amount of time the penitent sin converges to a finite value: in every possible world with non-overwhelming temptation (1 Cor. 10:18).

So why doesn't God just put the elect in Heaven directly? Here, we clearly have some of God's anger at sins, and one cannot rightfully complain that everything should be excused (John 5:14). I reject the idea that our Earthly punishment merits our sins (similar to purgatory) on the basis of the converse mercy in the Parable of the Wages.

Mercy

Removing this type of legalism can allow something "unfair" but beneficial to happen (against Russell's objection that it's a copout to say that bad things to the good are tests, but the evil deserve them). For example, in Matt. 9:13, Jesus notes how God can forgive - "I desire mercy, not sacrifice". Similarly, why sinners who won't repent don't have to instantly be sent to Hell like Satan was cast out from Heaven. Or why Jesus' sacrifice can pay for the crimes of others. This isn't God being "unjust" but simply removing an earlier legalism which had been in place for different reasons (like the indiscriminate forces of the universe, but in this case symbolic reasons such as the food laws of the Torah). Legalism belongs to deficient bureaucratic systems, not perfect, all-powerful justice. This is the converse of the fact that God is free to allow evil (Problem of Evil). But not because of legalism, but the logic from His will: if he wishes to punish wickedness, then He would choose to show mercy to any degree He wants: to both wicked and righteous (Matt. 5:45; Rom. 9:15). This isn't "injustice" any more than letting someone out on bail. Some are denied bail, but that's because of a fear they'd run or cause more damage. This is not an issue for an omnipotent, omniscient being, who has His reasons for not punishing right away, frequently choosing to reveal sins in order to shame wickedness.

Nor does this doesn't mean that God owes salvation to the penitent (because it's fair), since He remits all punishment for them. And for all we know, all people would have, given enough power, done sins of infinite magnitude (i.e. unlimited pain for a finite time) - which can occur if an individual was given an infinite power of the lowest cardinality. Quantum fluctuations prevent particles from going to an infinite amount of power under renormalization theory.

Change of Penitent

But one can reasonably wonder, "Doesn't this mean someone is penitent and sinful at the same time?" We've removed space and time, which if free will exists should have no bearing on intent and responsibility (or being at the wrong place and time is your fault even if you're powerless - essentially determinism). If we have the pure choices of the person's free will outside/before space-time, then it's difficult to see what role change could have. What I mean is, without time, something either is or isn't. And if someone has/would commit a sin, if he can't change this choice, then there could be no repentance.

But this assumes that free will is subject to time, and logical progression can exist outside of it - for example the forces that created the universe. Also entanglement exceeds the speed of light and is possibly instantaneous.

Hartle-Hawking Proposal: contradicting Creation?

Another situation that this solves is how God can create the universe if it existed infinitely in the past. Most (including popular science books) misinterpret Stephen Hawking, who changed his view that the Big Bang began the universe, but only that our current space and time did - he theorized that there were an endless amount of such expansions prior in an infinite past - the Hartle-Hawking Proposal. Since Hilbert Spaces can have any cardinality, God can create a universe with an infinite past.

Origin of Free Will

If God cannot tamper with free will, where does it come from?

Free will can't be predetermined by outside factors. Meaning, it's as good as random with respect to nature and its results. It may seem easy to say that God can create a force that generates random objects; or in this case, free will that has its own choices. But can God create something that's random with respect to Him? That makes free will essentially created and uncreated. So the answer is "No": if God is omnipotent, then all power is from Him and thus nothing can be random with respect to Him since it's from His will.

So how can sin exist if God is omnipotent and morally perfect? Since God knows all counterfactuals, including what choices someone would make if they had uncreated free will, He can accurately portray someone's choices.

But how can something impossible be a counterfactual? Something can be valid but impossible. For example, God could've never created the world - valid, but impossible with respect to the fact that He did. Since the power of counterfactuals doesn't technically exist, God's omnipotence isn't negated.

And we don't need to assume God's existence to prove counterfactuals. If we ask, where did the universe come from, we can say that either it came from nowhere or something created it. This force/being either makes it out of something else, like the Greek "chaos", or nothing as well - the Christian Ex Nihilo. If out of something else, what is this something else made from? The question simply repeats until it's either out of nothing or out of an infinite regress of "somethings" which would not have an origin. So in both cases, with respect to results, the universe's layout is arbitrary. This means that counterfactuals are valid (different from true), because if it's random it could've been one way instead of another.

However, we run into two problems. How can a counterfactual that could've never technically existed be valid? And therefore how can it be specific - i.e. how can this counterfactual be anything but one possibility of many. In other words, in one counterfactual I'm not evil, in another I am.

If we suppose a counterfactual of another being, this being would only act in one way due to modal collapse (meaning its actions are necessary in only one way due to omnipotence: the way it chose), or else you can't meaningfully talk about the same being and you're describing another one. And thus all these infinite beings would have one "immutable" way of acting, which God represents with our actions in this world and angels/demons outside it. There aren't "possibilities" because it is their will that guides their actions, not their nature or some other external random factor. Thus, they would repeat their choices under the same exact circumstances. This doesn't deny omnipotence as these counterfactuals don't exist. Nor is His omniscience contradicted anymore than God's will preceding His knowledge is.

But from where does this "true nature" of our free will come from? If God is making us in a world where our choices show what we would have done and represent who we really are, where does this "real" and immutable (or else why make/allow us to be sinners?) self come from? If from God, we have the original problem of "where does free will come from?" If not, then there's some power that God didn't make. This synthetic Euthyphro dilemma is easily solvable. First, God can't make everyone into non-sinners yet not influence: this would be like saying can He do and not do something at the same time (Rock Heavy). Second, if He knows what we would do if we were omnipotent, then this would be the answer to where this "true self" comes from. And God is only representing our true selves and the choices we would have made if we had our own power. So it's not that we don't have a choice: we would have made such choices anyway.

It's a bit like asking where mathematical objects or theorems come from: these would be valid whether the world existed or not: would the color red become "invalid" if all red sweaters were burned? True, colors are based on wavelength which is a property of the universe, but can you use any color besides red and it be red?

If these beings are omnipotent, then they're uncountably infinite. But this isn't a problem for their identity anymore than it is for any irrational number such as pi, which is uncountable yet fixed. Nor is it some kind of contradiction to have a "set" of their choices (i.e. in God's knowledge) as they are all the same cardinality (and thus like Hilbert's Hotel, God's knowledge won't be exhausted).

One very important question comes up though. How can God know facts about synthetic realities that are impossible, even if they're (validly) necessary? God can know impossible things such as what an Earth with two Moons would be like, though He decreed it to have only one. But this is a deterministic and thus predictable scenario. How can God know specific free choices (random with respect to everything but the chooser) that never exist? But this assumes not only causality in knowledge, making it justified true belief, but that God needed to learn. Though they are random, they exist fully (i.e. they're not a mystery): the counterfactual has "played out" since the intent of the being is known through it. And it can be shown that information can be transferred instantaneously in physics: the double-slit experiment which has been done with one particle at a time, showing the particle (or some part of it) was in two places at once! [May 2022 experiment by University of Technology in Viena] Since it's one particle and it's whole, for it or some part of it to travel through both paths means information can be transferred instantaneously. And the measurements don't allow some kind of "course reversal" or other hidden variables (von Neumann Existence Theorem). Similarly, it's known that entanglement is thousands of times faster than the speed of light (if not instantaneous). This doesn't become negated by superdeterminism nor by "God doing it", because either way the information transfers in 0 time, and if there are no hidden variables so far as the experiment can detect, then whether superdeterminism or God did it, either way there is information transfer without causality. And this is how God can know things without learning, as well as how He can do things without "entering Creation". Regardless of any possible loophole, time had a beginning, so whether the universe came from nothing or something else, at the beginning there was information transfer in 0 time. And mathematically, one can have logical "pre-time" (Hartle-Hawking Proposal).

Ultimately, the effects of free will can be random with respect to the universe but be logical and immutable. For example, the square root of 2 (or 5, 7, 11, etc) has digits that are completely random and not in a sequence - with respect to each other. But the square root of 2 will have those same digits every time.

An objection to this comes from Findlay (1955) who has an argument against omnipotence: if God is all-powerful, then His actions are necessary, and thus not mere possibilities. Therefore He cannot do anything besides the actions He has and will make; and counterfactuals were never possible. This, however, misunderstands validity. Omnipotence, in whichever form, is necessary, and there can be different kinds of omnipotences (not coexisting, but in theory): a shape necessarily has three sides if it's a triangle, but if it's a square it necessarily has four. And this is probably a Halting problem similar to the "Can God make a rock He can't lift" question: God's will is necessary with respect to His creation, not Him.

Nature of Intent

The very concept of intent may seem to require a "real" existence of something in which it's contained, as well as real existence of things by which it can intend as well as express. For instance, if an angel "intended" bad, how do we define bad without an action/concept in reality that we've deemed an expression? But, if the universe can simply exist in virtue of its own power, then it is entirely possible for any other entity to do so as well. Otherwise, like Zeno's Paradox of Place, what's the universe contained in? And what's that contained in? And an infinite regress simply exists all the same. And this would be the "location" of free will and origin of its choices.

Another way to look at it is that time is simply one possible arbitrary way of portraying change. Otherwise, to suppose that time is needed is legalism and breaks the assumption that something can be more powerful than the universe's space-time or exist outside/before/after it; an assumption that should be true if the universe's forces aren't omnipotent. If we ask the question of "what came before time?", this Stephen Hawking portrays as a question similar to asking what's "south of the South Pole?" And quite rightfully - with respect to the universe. So presuming someone to be outside of space and time, the question of "how can change be determined" and "what's at the end of (logically causal) time" become equally irrelevant or at best definitional with the identity/power of the force (in this case the person's free will). In other words, a person's change is not defined along any time, and so one does not need to deal with "at the end of infinity" of time of any cardinality: it would be like knowing something like light is what it is simply by its being: it doesn't need any external space-time to define it or allow it to exist, much like the universe itself runs on its own existence and clock.

This is demonstrable through Quantum Mechanics, where Schrödinger's Cat is neither dead and alive until the wave function collapses making it one or the other. More specifically, quantum superposition says that it's partially both dead and alive - i.e. 50% (chance of being) dead, 50% alive. Talk about the classic glass half-full/empty situation; the quantum physicist will say it's (partially?) both! The point is that, as quantum states are the building blocks of reality, prior to the wave collapse, the cat is neither dead nor alive, because quite literally the universe hasn't made either possibility a reality yet! Surely then, reality isn't necessarily dependent upon the forces of nature. So if someone was his "own" force of nature, he could represent himself and his choices without space or time, instead making his own "space-time" through the reality of his own power.

The essence of a thing can exist irrelevant as to how it's portrayed, as long as it's accurate (e.g. if I sin with brown or black shoes, it's still the same sin of mine).

Origin of Choice: Good and Evil without Temptation

Where does a choice come from? If I accept that indiscriminate physical forces are not responsible for my personal choices for which I'm either guilty or justified, then how do I make the choice to make a choice? A metaphysical origin would just move the problem to impersonal forces outside the universe.

This isn't a mechanism question of "how is it possible?" (see here). But, how does the decision "I choose to do good" vs "I choose to do evil" arise if there are no motivations (=influences/temptations)? If I say "out of nothing," then it's either a random impersonal force - which implies determinism - or there must be some mediator which only brings the question up again.

But one does not need motivation to do good or bad. I'm not just talking about the classic psychotic, although I guess it could be boiled down to that. Basically, if we took the volition of any being, human or angel, and gave it unlimited power (even with unlimited knowledge), we'd have either a malevolent or good deity. It doesn't even have to be true omnipotence: think of any dictator. If God knows all alternatives, there wouldn't be any motivation but a person's own pure, uninfluenced decision to be just or not. This is what the Bible says as well (John 3:19-21; 1 Cor. 10:13).

I can have a craving for candy or unhealthy junkfood. Or I can say to myself, "I'd like to try this addicting thing everyone seems to like" (second order desire). If we suppose a being had unlimited power, this being would make a reality suited to his tastes. What these tastes are, or more accurately would be, is how God judges, and is probably how Satan and the demons got kicked out of Heaven.

"Do I choose my own comfort over others' needs?" is a question that needs variables other than choice and result. It's a misjudgment to presume that temptations always cloud the issue of "pure" choice, since they actually explain it by revealing it. The idea of a perfect vacuum where a being either does good or bad for its own sake while rational is not denied, because if I'm unwilling to get up and go to work because I'm lazy while my children starve is exactly the same, except the reasons allow us to visualize it.

The Tree of Knowledge in Eden: Entrapment or Discovery?

If someone isn't influenced by circumstances and will listen or in this case disobey regardless, then giving them an opportunity is not so much enabling influence, as it is exposing them.

This explains why/how the Devil sinned and was thrown out of Heaven "like lightning", being the personification of evil, while probably not having done all that much if anything, and making the seemingly incomprehensible and ludicrous choice of rebelling against God (like the other demons).

It also explains why God, metaphorically or not, placed the Tree of Knowledge in Eden, especially knowing Adam and Eve would eat from it despite His warning. The opposite of entrapment: like a "bait car" it's exposing them!

Works are Real

It's not that actions of charity or evil in this world are irrelevant - they are simply a small glimpse from a larger whole, which God chooses to represent by the present world and its circumstances in a way that he knows would be true, because He's not a legalist. This is judged by the intent of a person, so the actual result is, as noted, irrelevant. This intent, like the works, is real but varies depending on the circumstances, since the individual doesn't have full knowledge, but ultimately is not influenced enough for the person to not display his true wishes (1 Cor. 10:13), and is genuinely his and representative of him. So just like works, to a degree it matters, to a degree it doesn't; but ultimately like works, it reflects what truly matters: who the person is, although in that case, the ultimate intent, like his free will, is the person.

Just like a man in 1000 BC would give a cold man a blanket, today he would give him a heater. Like how 3/6=2/4=1/2 and all equal one half, even though different numbers represent it. These works are as real as all the hypothetical "would've beens" - obviously God would not make something unrelated and confusing in this world. But it's because of this that one cannot do evil to achieve good: one cannot really know the ultimate ends, which isn't the point anyway, but to follow God's will who created the circumstances as a fair test. This is why an agent acting under God's command can do things that on his own would be wrong (e.g. the Israelite command to destroy the Canaanites).

But just as works only reflect faith and have no value in and of themselves, so also these do nothing but to reflect the kind of person someone truly is in the grand scheme of things. Of course, this would make a very intricate and complicated interconnection between billions of humans (to make one man a lawyer, and another his client, etc), which doubtlessly God can handle (Ephesians 4:11), but what if it's contradictory? I believe if it had been, then these people would have been made something like angels if repentant or demons if not (Mark 12:25b), so if the world had been somehow impossible because people wouldn't choose certain things according to influence so that God exposes their good or bad, He would've made us all angels and demons, or something celestial like that.

To a degree this is legalism blocking legalism: just like how the human body is technically made of non-living material (atoms), but is itself alive. So I cannot pretend murder isn't real by saying that the atoms of my knife are merely moving into the atoms of a person's body: there's clear intent based upon my knowledge (if I am sane and know what I'm doing). In the same way works and "partial" intent aren't truly representative of everything a person is, so I can't reason that the "sweet old lady around the corner who simply didn't believe in Jesus" is unfairly sent to Hell. And this is why works do not save, yet faith can be called a work (1 Thess. 1:3). So faith is credited to someone as righteousness (Rom. 4:5), meaning God knows what this person would truly do in alternate scenarios. But works also have to be real just like justice ultimately needs to be enforced by power (e.g. God's omnipotence) to be relevant: otherwise one is just a dreamer.

So I think this also answers the question of "I didn't ask to be made or to be thrown here with such high stakes (Heaven or Hell)" - well no criminal asks that justice be served either. But it's a question of ultimately what a person would do.

One can reasonably ask how can something finite (this world) represent something infinite (our "true" selves)? But if one is given a partial glimpse of a painting, he can have a rough idea of what it's about and in what style it was made. If the question is more technical, i.e. how can anything infinite be actually reduced in any way to something finite, then it's just like how the set of all natural numbers is infinite, but each element (each natural number: 1, 2, 3...) is finite. One isn't guilty of every possibility, which would be legalism, but the intent behind it. So the question wouldn't be, "Why did you steal the bike?" but "Why did you steal?"

The Potter and the Pots

This actually brings up an interesting question. In some places, the Bible teaches that God being Creator makes us answerable to Him. But why? Obviously He can force us by his power. But is there any logical justification? It may seem unnecessary to prove this, but parents can't force their children to do what they want even if it's sensible. They can't exact revenge physically for it.

We can't answer that so-and-so would've done such-and-such crime under different circumstances, because the entire issue revolves around the legitimacy of punishing these crimes. In nature, weakness gets eliminated, but often in cruel ways, so we can't assume God's power of creation gives him this right. Essentially, if the pot had feelings, can the potter still do as he likes? Pets are owned by people but they still can't be abused, legally and humanely speaking.

The intuition that God can judge and punish evil-doers, however, comes not from his power only, but from what this power entails. Since others are wronged by sins, it remains that the party most capable in rectifying the injury should do so. The saying, "all evil needs to succeed is for good men to do nothing," expresses this sentiment. My rationale for supposing that God has the right to create beings that logically didn't ask to be created, and throw them in this all-or-nothing struggle of rules they are often ignorant of is that He is weeding out those who unfairly and selfishly would harm others.

So the Parable of the Unmerciful Servant (Matt. 18:21-35) has a wealthy man forgive a large debt of one of his slaves. This slave in turn does not forgive a tiny but significant for his lendee debt. The wealthy man is outraged and punishes the unforgiving slave. Why is he outraged and what business is it of his what the slave forgives and that he should punish? Well the necessary assumption (because this concerns the damned) is that this was indeed a brutal and unfair act, and that it's only fair the slave should get the same fate. In that sense, one seeks justice and one doesn't need to rely on luck because God is all-powerful and just. To object to this would be similar to not wanting justice for one's self: yes it's true that the lesser slave borrowed the money, but the parallel only explores the needlessness of putting him under the circumstances of misery (maybe he had no choice but to borrow it, and would repay it but with a lot of headaches). It may be true that an injured person would want justice, but is vengeance an answer? Does it undo anything? In this case, the lesser slave is spared a financial burden, but in many cases the crime can't be interrupted or reversed. But it's exactly because of this that God punishes evil-doers because if you can't prevent their crimes, what else can you do? Hence God says, "vengeance is mine," don't pay back evil for evil because you don't really know who is what and how much and even if that's a terrible person, the best way to spite evil is with good (Rom. 12:19).

4. Why make the hellbound?

Why doesn't God simply not create the unrepentant to spare them from Hell? Why not just forgive everyone? But as we saw, if the crime deserving the punishment is just, there's no reason to forgive them. Moreover, this presumes that the universe is somehow the final power: if it doesn't exist, it can't. For this reason, Kant argued against Anselm's proof of God: existence is not a property, as it doesn't describe anything other than its representation (which is arbitrary, like the universe's laws if they're the highest power). Does a tree make a sound if no one hears it fall? And I don't mean the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, which is simply part of the universe's laws, and is in fact another proof of this concept, being essentially Plato's Cave.

Then, one can suppose maybe God should ignore the unrepentant. Why doesn't God simply not make them? Even if they would have done something bad, they aren't and won't - if He doesn't make them. Looking at it from this angle, God is burning people in Hell for things they could've never done since God didn't and would've never let them - a conundrum on the opposite side of the Problem of Evil!

Yet to suppose that these crimes "don't exist" simply because there isn't a physical space and time like ours to portray them is probably not entirely accurate. If a bike thief doesn't find any bikes to steal, he's only excused on a technicality; even if someone removed all the bikes in the world, he'd still be a thief. The universe isn't more powerful than God's law. Similarly, the Knowability Paradox proves that all (knowable) truths must always be known. Therefore, created or not, God would constantly know of these are evildoers. And this also means that counterfactuals can be known otherwise one is assuming that the will is predicated upon the universe's laws or another power (i.e. determinism/compatibilism).

Paul has a similar observation in Romans 7:7-12 (esp. vv.9-10). But he notes that just because sin was announced through the Law, that doesn't make the Law bad because it only exposes evil (Romans 7:13, 10:2-3).

Seeing above, "Nature of Intent", we show that evil intentions exist whether or not they are actuated by a physical representation. To say that God could simply ignore/not create the hellbound is basically like asking, "Does it matter if I cuss out a deaf person behind their back?" but much worse: and saying those people should simply be told, "don't worry about a punishment". One can think that, but it's God's decision to do that or not.

This isn't like Nero being given a gold medal at a chariot race after being thrown on the grounds that he would have won. Though the idea recognizes legalism, a race is meant to be based on rules grounded in the arbitrary laws of physics such as natural ability or better luck. One could otherwise complain that they would've won if they had that one better trainer who was unavailable.

Bottomline is, to not make the hellbound to not punish them is like not asking a liar a question so he wouldn't lie: it doesn't make him less of a liar. Or giving your money to a thief so that he's "not stealing" it.

God is punishing people for something they will never do. Why not ignore them?

If we had a time machine and went back to 1932 before Hitler had power, I don't think many would call it unjust to imprison him for the rest of his life - even though he technically wouldn't have done anything "yet". On the other hand, if we imagine that all of his actions up to and including WWII were a virtual reality simulation, but his intentions were real, we'd be a little less eager to do anything but ignore and laugh at him. This just shows how easily human bias is swayed by emotion: fact vs fiction makes a big difference even if the intent, which as we noted is all that ethics looks at, is the same.

For example, in 492 BC the Athenian tragedian, Phrynichus, wrote a play about the recent sacking of Miletus by the Persians - The Capture of Miletus. It stirred up so much emotion amongst the Athenians that according to Herodotus he was fined 1000 drachmas and the play banned. No wonder of the 32 ancient Greek tragedies we have, 31 were based on myth rather than history. My point is that what doesn't happen in our world, doesn't particularly upset us, as seen with the time travel vs virtual reality example above. This way, we can't intuitively recognize that just because someone doesn't exist, doesn't mean that his unrepentant crimes that God knows he would 100% do are any less heinous. Like math, which exists whether there are mathbooks or not, these actions are as valid as the fact that 2+2=4 with or without an abbacus. If it were possible to overlook these, God would have the way he seems to do with respect to dangerous animals, some of whom frequently killed humans, especially children (Isaiah 11:8).

I want to show that God is not cruel or unfair in creating the hellbound. Just because their evil could've been avoided by not making them, or putting them under different circumstances (e.g. if Hitler was admitted into art school), doesn't make their potential but inevitable counterfactually sins any less repugnant. Imagine someone attempts to murder a child but completely fails to the point that neither the child nor his parents realize whatever it was he tried. I don't think many would spare such a person at least some kind of punishment. No one was harmed in any way. Even if no one saw him, the idea of him being punished isn't considered repugnant or unfair. Intuitively, the same would go for someone who cusses out a deaf person behind their back. Technically we can show that this isn't bias because culpability should be based on intent, not circumstances independent of one's control. So, I'm not to be genuinely rewarded or punished for accidents outside my ability. If I lie on a resume and get a job where I do something by sheer luck that others could by their skills, I'll still expect to get fired if they find out I'm not qualified. And no one blames a baby for waking up his parents in the middle of the night.

Similarly, if the only reason I don't have evil intent is because the circumstances that would evoke it out of me aren't present, then my intent is technically obstructed, or more accurately, unobservable. It's the converse of telling a man to fly by pushing him off a cliff and then concluding it's his fault he failed. What I want to say is that the absence of factors that would otherwise beget my true intention does not make it technically excusable if it would be evil. Basically by claiming that God could not only spare people from Hell, but spare their victims pain, is like saying God can magically make them repentant by removing their free will and calling them righteous, and on a technical basis, that's invalid.

IV. Jesus' Sacrifice: Legitimate Payment?

How can sin be Forgiven?

This question has two parts: (1) If sin is like a stain, how can it ever be forgiven or forgotten? Can you undo time/reality? Can you unstain a blank sheet of paper? Can you unscramble eggs? (2) How can God actually call it fair to have mercy and use (kill!) Jesus, whereas someone can't go to jail for someone else's crimes

This first question I find more serious and difficult."Yet I was once your emperor" - the last words of the Roman emperor Vitellius. No one could take that away from him, not even his executioners. But if a car misses an exit on the freeway, yet ultimately reaches its destination and time weren't a factor, then it becomes irrelevant how many detours it had to take.

The question then becomes, "Is it dishonoring God that a being that actually sinned is allowed in His presence?" and the answer becomes similar to Muslim objections to Jesus being God ("shameful human body, etc"). It's a little bit like looking at a fraction, 1/2 for example, and arguing that 0.5 must be an integer because both 1 and 2 are - it simply ignores the process that "1" and "2" represent, in my opinion. God could have chosen to forgive or not forgive our sins despite how penitent we would be, and been perfectly just and non-malicious either way: a sobering fact to remember.

A minor issue can arise here: if we remove time, which earlier we argued has no place in culpability, how can someone be a sinner and sinless at the same time (having sinned and penitent become "actively sin and repent" at the same time due to no past/time)? This is actually not as difficult an objection as it might seem. Just like the validity of a motivation (be it "sin in Heart" or the "Origin of Choice/Nature of Intent"), one does not need to divorce circumstance from intent after removing time. What I mean is that a blind person may not have a favorite color, but that doesn't mean it's invalid to suppose he could and would should he see - and that favorite colors would be an impossible reality but not impossible concept without the existence of light. In a sense this prefers Aristotle's essentialism over Abelard's nominalism. There are two good examples I can give that defend this.

For example, the Monty Hall math problem where a contestant picks one of three doors, only one of which has a prize, shows how circumstance and causality can exist without time. In the end, when one of the losing doors is revealed, the contestant chooses one of two doors, which anyone would tell you is 50/50, but this is not the case here because of previous circumstances and it's actually 33%/66% chance. Of course, you can't have that situation without time, which is exactly the point: imagine watching only the end result of 100 contestants and seeing that 2/3 of those who switched doors won as opposed to 1/3 for those who didn't: you'd be thoroughly confused and think statistics has gone out the window. That's exactly what we have here: someone sinning and not sinning at the same time while being absolved and penitent. Another example would be Schrödinger's Cat, which has the cat be both dead and alive at the same time, objections over which resulted in Stephen Hawking's retort that, "one cannot test reality with a litmus" - in other words, you can't tell reality what it can be, especially since you can only test it by...reality.

The second question also seems to have two or three parts: how can mercy be reconciled with justice/fairness? How can God do this to Jesus? How is it justice even if Jesus' intentions were merciful and good?

The first question is simple: justice is presumed if the person is penitent; mercy is simply the willingness to abide by the logic in the previous question: "Why/how can sin be forgiven/forgotten?" - imagine a person who gets mad at you and goes too far and breaks something valuable of yours - he then apologizes, fixes it perfectly, yet you still get him in trouble. The reaction we'd have is, "Understandable, but that kind of sucks." That's why in many circumstances a victim of a minor abuse (e.g. got slapped by an angry friend) can choose to not press charges.

This relates to the other two questions: it was Jesus' own willingness, if we assume He's in communion with God, to show mankind how repugnant sin is by dying the way he did. And it was never only Jesus' death that saves, as if a murderer can be absolved by someone else going to jail, but the person's own repentance - that's why Paul calls repentance dying and being raised anew. It's true that no matter how penitent a person is in our justice system, this cannot happen, but that's a weakness in our system which is necessitated by the fact that we don't know the future (will the murderer decide to murder again?) - not a problem for God at all, who knows everything. In fact, the switch in the last century or so from a retribution-based system of justice, to a reformative one - where a criminal isn't punished for vengeance's sake, but to reform him, knowing that killing one man won't bring another from the dead, would indicate the above as well as how it's just and possible for God to forgive sins. It's true that the Bible calls God's justice "vengeance," and that's exactly what it is and always should be upon the unrepentant only.

The Jewish Law

This section concerns two main issues: Was Jesus' sacrifice legal according to the Jewish system and is it acceptable that he pay for our sins when we were the sinners?

The two questions are closely connected even though their subjects are completely different. The first deals with the Jewish sacrificial system - a specific form of cultic ritual. The second considers the judicial point of view of fairness and justice.

However, when it becomes understood that there was never any legalism involved in Jesus' sacrifice, the connection appears and both issues disappear. Hebrews 10:1-12 points out that the blood of animals was just a ritual which couldn't take away sins, yet in 9:13-14 notes that it did remove sins. Clearly, then, Jesus' sacrifice, while necessary in Jewish eyes (Heb. 9:15, 22; 10:12) and to a degree worldly ones for proof in a world made the way it is, was intended like Jesus' baptism as a message of what sin does and how much God cares about us and righteousness. That's why Adam's sin affected all and why Jesus' sacrifice was for all: one technicality removed by another (Rom. 5:19). In Hebrews 9:16-17 the example of a will is used, where it's noted that it has no force until the person dies. Obviously God doesn't need to follow yet another kind of technicality like the law, and Jesus' spirit was never dead, only his body. Jesus' death was a symbol that was never meant to be taken as an attempt to be pedantic within the guidelines of Jewish law: Jesus is merely the lamb that saves, like the one that represents the salvation in Egypt. There are many key evidences of this such as the fact that Israel's sins were exculpated on Yom Kippur in the fall, rather than on Passover in the spring. But this is a legalism that while technically closer to Jesus' function, destroys the metaphor of life with the symbol of the Passover which equated to the same thing. It's simply irrelevant that Passover didn't forgive sins, just as that many of the other rules aren't followed by Jesus' sacrifice, starting with the fact that he's not an actual lamb but a human!

As for fairness, it can be asked how it makes sense that someone pays for another's crimes. If I get convicted of a capital crime, I can't get someone else to go to jail for me, no matter how much they might be willing to do it! The problem is that, once again, we slap legalism on God who merely tried explaining the connection between Himself, man, and repentance in a way the Jews of the time could understand. It can be wondered why God needs sacrifice when all He wants is obedience (1 Sam. 15:22) if Jesus' death was legalistically necessary for God to forgive. Muslims criticized Christianity on this point and pointed to their theology's superiority where God was powerful enough to "simply forgive". Simply put, the Jews could not understand forgiveness without sacrifice (1 Cor. 15:17), and the symbol of an innocent man dying for those who don't deserve it displays God's boundless love and mercy (Rom. 5:6-11) is a powerful metaphor and connection between God and man through Jesus, emphasized everywhere in the New Testament. God is not some distant force like in Islam and even to a degree Judaism and pretty much every other religion: He sent His Son to die for us, and is with the believers at every turn (Matt. 18:19-20; Acts 1:8; John 14:26)! Jesus' life also helped serve as a model (Heb. 2:18, 4:15; John 14:31).

Ransom et al theories of Atonement

Why is a sacrifice necessary?

God condones human sacrifice?

Occasionally the meaningful act of compassion (willingly!) done by Jesus is overlooked and, like the legalistic objections above, the question of God condoning human sacrifice can be brought up. This has two parts: didn't he ban this in the Old Testament as detestable, and well, isn't it detestable?

The Old Testament commands were against the practices of the Canaanites, who performed child sacrifices. This was also out of their own corrupt stupidity, not from God. Abraham and Jephthah are praised for following through God's commands. As far as it being detestable in and of itself in Jesus' case, his death in that way is metaphorically described as a sacrifice, which technically functioned as one, but the actual action was his death: we all die. How God interprets and presents this death is His choice. There is a correlation between Canaanite child sacrifice and Jesus' death. The Carthaginians, whose culture originates from Tyre (in Canaan) also practiced child sacrifice. They offered their firstborn children for victory or to avert disaster - clearly a genuine token of an offering exactly the way Jesus is presented (John 3:16, Luke 2:7).

But the self-serving nature becomes a little evident. For example, when the Carthaginians lost to Agathocles, they thought their child sacrifices weren't good enough because they didn't sacrifice noble ones. They decided to sacrifice 200 children of the nobility and in their enthusiasm sacrificed 300. Alternatively, in addition to the 200 noble ones, they sacrificed 300 common ones, which may be pointless or may be going "that extra mile". I think the three Punic Wars with Rome shows that perhaps these children were better help as Carthaginian soldiers than firewood.

V. Opposing Verses from Scripture

Matthew 18:1-6, 19:14

Here Jesus compares true believers to the innocence of children. But if some of these children grow up to be sinners, or are merely children in form, then doesn't this contradict? No, because the child at that point, with respect to us is an example of how one should be. Clearly Jesus knew they would grow up to be sinners. And some children are very bad from a young age.

Luke 12:47-48

These verses say:

The servant who knows the master s will and does not get ready or does not do what the master wants will be beaten with many blows. But the one who does not know and does things deserving punishment will be beaten with few blows. From everyone who has been given much, much will be demanded; and from the one who has been entrusted with much, much more will be asked. (HCSB)

1 Corinthians 8:9-13

These verses seem awfully critical of someone just because how it might affect others. One man's choices can't be blamed on another, so why is the man with a "strong" conscience, as Paul puts it, guilty of helping the sin of the weak one?

There's an implicit degree of, "in case you knew better" because in 1 Cor. 10:14-33 a man who is either at a pagan feast or a non-Christian friend's house would obviously know that his presence and eating sacrificed food would be ascribed to participation in idolatry. So in Romans 14, Paul gives advice to both sides: don't judge the one who eats (v.13), and don't eat if (as far as you know) it distresses your brother or sister (v.15).

1 Corinthians 11:17-34

It seems that someone could be guilty of disrespecting God by how they eat (compare Rom. 14:20)?! The reason is hunger (v.34), not intentional disrespect. But just like a negligent sin such as drunk driving, it could have been obvious enough to be purposeful: we don't have enough information. The punishment of sickness and death (v.30) recalls the warning God gave Abimelech (Gen. 20). Abimelech and his household fall ill, despite the fact that he did nothing wrong, which God acknowledges (vv.4-6). The reason for the sickness is so that Abimelech takes the warning in verse 7 seriously or else he could suppose it was just a stupid dream. So the members of the church who fell ill must've been under a warning, while those who passed away must've really crossed the line. Paul himself admits that there's quite a few wolves in sheeps' clothing (vv.18-19; 1 Cor. 5:1-2).

VI. Unjust Episodes

Unlike the previous section, this section doesn't deal with contrary logic to this article's main thesis, but instead focuses on parts of the Bible where God's actions seem unfair based on the logic, implicit or stated, given in the text. So questions like, "Was the Flood fair?" which was due to wickedness are avoided in favor of questions like "Why didn't the Philistines die when they looked into the Ark, but the Israelites did?"

Achan and Collective Punishment

Collective punishment is frequently found in the Bible, especially the Old Testament. Logic dictates that each man is responsible for his own actions, although these may influence those of another (Gal. 6:1-5). In Joshua 7 the Israelites suffer a defeat at Ai and it's revealed that someone disobeyed God's command to hand over all loot after Jericho's fault. Ancient cleromancy is used to discover the guilty party, and it is Achan.

The problem here isn't that Achan was stoned for what every soldier in the history of the world has done: loot the defeated. No one would really find this particularly objectionable, but God's command, placed there so that Israel would listen to Him in the face of the extremely tempting religious practices of the land, made it punishable by death. This is part of the Problem of Evil, a situation where like the extermination of the Canaanites God has a more direct role, and isn't the point of discussion.

Instead, it's the fact that Achan and his whole family, including his children, are killed, like what every usurper did to the royal house from ancient, medieval, to modern times (Romanovs) to not allow rebellion. That this is a symbol is obvious from the fact that his loot and livestock are also destroyed. But what did the children do? Again, the issue isn't why the brutality against them, but why are they being punished for what Achan did? Even if we suppose that they most certainly knew about what their father did and possibly even helped him dig the hole from camp to camp, didn't tell anyone - it's clear that Achan is the head of the household and they didn't have much authority.

In reality it would be naive to think that Achan was the only soldier who did this, helped by his household or not. And when one remembers that many of God's commands weren't kept for centuries, including the main one of circumcision by Joshua's wilderness generation, it makes the Achan situation that much more curious. It's obvious that he was meant to be an example at a time when God wanted to establish his power so the Israelites don't deviate. Like George Washington who dealt with a mutiny in his army by rounding up the 8 ringleaders and only executing the main one to set an example but have mercy at the same time. In that sense, the issue is not one of fairness in terms of justice, but only God's mercy/love - i.e. the Problem of Evil.

This is true of the other cases of collective punishment. The plague in 2 Samuel 24 is because of David, who pleads to God on those grounds (v.17). It's clear that these are messages which God chooses to do in a way that is brutal to reflect all men's sins. Otherwise He could have easily created the Israelites miraculously with minds that wouldn't be so easily deviated by the foreign religions.

The Man of God and the lion (1 Kings 13)

Here we have a very interesting situation. An unrighteous king (Jeroboam I of Israel) is reproved by a prophet. The prophet is then killed by a lion on his way back?!? It's not so much the strangeness of this reversal where you would think the prophet of God wouldn't have such an end, but how and why it happens. He's expressly told by God to not eat or drink in Israel and not go back to Judah the same way. An older, northern Israelite prophet who seems to have been impressed invites him to dine with him. The prophet refuses for the reason above, but the Israelite insists, telling him that an angel had said it was ok that he deviate. Having been told he was also a prophet, he accepts. The old prophet rebukes him with a death sentence and on his way back he's killed by a lion...because of what the older prophet did...who then rebuked him for it...

If you ask me it should've been the other guy who gets it not just because he's the main and only reason for it, but because he had the nerve to invite him, disrespect him at the meal, condemn him, all while having lied to him! At least he had the decency to go back and retrieve the body and bury it in a tomb. The statement, "your body will not be buried in the tomb of your ancestors," actually carries a threat that goes beyond physical demise. The ancient Near Eastern purview had the afterlife where a man's sons buried him in his household tomb so that he could be carried to the netherworld in peace. Abraham had similar concerns (Gen. 15:3), and Jacob wanted to be buried in Canaan in the family tomb (Gen. 49:29-32). In effect, as far as the Judahite prophet knew, he was denied paradise. We know that this isn't the case, so this objection to fairness can be removed - only the peace of mind of the man for that day, adding to his stress.

But we can't know what reasons God had for allowing this (Matt. 7:21-23). Perhaps it's as simple as needing a continuously stubborn refusal (2 Ki 5:16). Certainly he seems to have been swayed a little easily just because the other man claimed he was a prophet and that an angel said it was ok. Balaam angers God for reasons we're not told, despite seemingly following the instructions given him (Num. 22:20ff.). David's census angers God (2 Sam. 24:1), whereas He personally orders not one but two in Moses' day (Num. 1:2; 26:2), and prescribed instructions for taking one (Exodus 30:12). So we simply aren't given all the details (compare the afternote in Jonah 1:10b).

Uzzah (2 Samuel 6)

Uzzah is killed on the spot for helping prop the Ark from falling off the ox on its hilly journey. Probably a reflex, he's killed for not wanting the big, important, antequated even by David's day object fall to the ground and possibly split into a million pieces, while helping David carry it to an important position on the top where Solomon would one day build the Temple. Real nice.

Once again, although the immediate reason might seem unjust, we cannot know why God ultimately made the Jerusalem hill as steep, made the ox as small, made the Ark tilt, made Uzzah be near it. The immediate cause for Judas' death was his regret that he betrayed Jesus, whom he considered a good man (Matt. 27:4-5), but probably betrayed because he envision the Messiah to liberate Israel from the Romans, like the rest of the Jews (John 6:15, 60-66). but we know that his betrayal was calculated over enough time to not be a spur of the moment, and that he was a thief (John 12:6).

Ark slaughter (1 Samuel 5-6)

Again, the issue isn't why the Israelites die from the Ark (that's the Problem of Evil and collective punishment discussed above). Why do the Philistines mainly only get sick while the Israelites immediately die from looking into the Ark? The Philistines even put the Ark in their pagan temple, and listen to their diviners as to how to end the plague (esp. see 1 Sam. 6:5 - "...perhaps He will stop oppressing you, your gods, and your land" !). The suggestion that the Philistines used captured Israelite Levites has some merit, but it still strikes one as if God is soft on the Philistines, because the first thing when the Ark returns is...to kill 70 Israelites for looking inside (1 Sam. 6:19); way to ruin the parade!

This isn't unfairness, but mercy shown upon pagans. God accepts their genuine repentance in light of what they knew, disregarding their pagan ideas (Acts 14:16; 17:22ff.). This is why Elisha accepts Naaman's request that he be allowed to help his master bow in the temple of Rimmon by him leaning on Naaman's hand (2 Ki 5:18-19).

Various Legal Prescriptions

[Leviticus 20:14] - A man marries a woman and then her mother. All three are burned. Presumably the first wife is innocent, so why she's also thrown in becomes a question. But the intent is that she probably agreed with it, and these crimes were judged on a case by case basis.

VII. Conclusion

Fairness is hard to understand, let alone prove when one is the object of the sentence (Heb. 12:7-11; Prov. 13:24). When trying to see the true nature of works, of which this world is only a shadow and reflection (1 Cor. 13:3, 8-13; Rom. 7:13b), it's easy to see why Job was simply referred to God's personal resume of past accomplishments (Job 41). Let's heed the warnings to do what's good instead of trying to outsmart the game or rewrite the rules, "for our God is a consuming fire."